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Legitimation Strategies of Informal Groups of States: The Case of the E3 
Directoire in the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Informal groups of states have emerged as a widely studied phenomenon in the European 
Union (EU) and other international organizations (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013; Stone, 
2011). In foreign and security affairs, however, research is still trailing behind. Although 
pioneering work has been published on different aspects (Aggestam and Bicchi, 2019; 
Elgström, 2017; Gegout, 2002; Prantl, 2005), the phenomenon of informal groups in foreign 
and security policy co-operation appears to be more widespread than is currently recognized in 
the literature, particularly in highly institutionalized settings such as the EU (Justaert and 
Keukeleire, 2012). 
Informal groups are a particularly controversial phenomenon in the EU, as they challenge and 
blur the already contested and complex nature of European leadership in foreign and security 
policy (Aggestam and Johansson, 2017: 1205). At the heart of the controversy of informal 
groups is the relationship between groups of EU member states as leaders and the other EU 
member states as followers. As will be shown in this article, directoires, i.e. self-appointed ad 
hoc groups of a small number of usually the most influential states within an international 
organization, are the most controversial type of informal group, as they establish a hierarchical 
relationship between powerful and less powerful EU member states and, thus, undermine the 
basic idea of European integration transcending hierarchies between big and small member 
states. Surprisingly, one of the most prominent cases of a directoire in European foreign and 
security policy has attracted scant attention from an explicitly institutional design perspective 
that problematizes the relationship between the informal group and the wider EU: the E3 format 
consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which led the nuclear negotiations 
with Iran (2003-15)1. Although Harnisch (2007) offers insights on ‘minilateral cooperation’ 
between the E3 and the United States and Alcaro (2018) and Hill (2011) examine the E3’s 
policies, most works on the E3 consider questions of institutional design and organizational 
behaviour of informal groups only in the margins. Sauer (2019), for his part, considers 
institutional design by analysing the choice of ad hoc informal groups as tools to resolve the 
Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. 
In contrast, this article argues that the E3 format is a particularly useful case to examine crucial 
issues of institutional design and organizational behaviour regarding the leadership of informal 
groups within international organizations. As a directoire consisting of the three most powerful 
member states in the EU, it brings to the fore the controversial hierarchical relationship between 
members and non-members of the directoire (Lake, 2009). It is a particularly clear-cut 
reflection of the fundamental dilemma between efficiency and legitimacy that can be found in 
all forms of informal groups of states (Delreux and Keukeleire, 2017). On the one hand, a 
directoire is an effective way of organizing and implementing common policies, as it 
circumvents the structural constraints of an international organization’s formal decision-
making process, while bringing to bear the combined resources and expertise of the most 
influential members of an organization. On the other hand, however, the existence of a closed 
group of influential states usually provokes the fear, resentment and resistance from those 
member states that are bound to accept the authority of the directoire. More specifically, 
following Reus-Smit (2007: 157)’s definition of political legitimacy, their ‘decisions and 
actions’ are not readily ‘socially sanctioned’ by the non-members. That is, directoires always 
suffer from a substantial lack of legitimacy. 
Given this inherent shortcoming, the existence of a directoire can be generally considered to 
be a rare phenomenon in EU foreign and security policy. Yet, if a directoire comes into 
existence and persists for a longer period of time, it is likely to have a significant impact on EU 
foreign and security policy due to its high degree of efficiency. It is, therefore, important to 
examine how directoires – and informal groups of states more generally – manage to resolve 
the intrinsic dilemma between efficiency and legitimacy and sustain themselves as leaders of 
an important policy area. In this regard, due to its particularly deep gap between efficiency and 
legitimacy, the E3 constitute a least-likely case for overcoming the efficiency-legitimacy 
dilemma and, thus, can offer new insights into how informal groups, especially directoires, 
manage to gain legitimacy. The article argues that the E3 have been able to implement three 
successive and increasingly effective legitimation strategies using different types of legitimacy 
sources, in particular problem-solving, institutional adjustments and fostering the institutional 
and policy congruence between the E3 and the other EU member states: First, ‘detachment’ 
was prevalent in the first year of the negotiations, between 2003 and early 2004. That is, the 
E3 tried to separate their activities from the wider EU during this time. Second, the ‘co-
optation’ of a formal EU representative in the form of the High Representative took centre 
stage between 2004 and 2009. Third, the period between 2010 and 2015 was characterized by 
the ‘integration’ of the E3’s policies within those of the wider EU. In this last phase of the 
negotiations, E3 and EU leadership have become almost undistinguishable. 
In the remainder of the article, this argument will be examined in depth following a twofold 
structure: First, drawing on various strands of literature on informal governance, legitimation 
processes and the legitimacy of international institutions, the article establishes the conceptual 
basis for both the particularly controversial nature of directoires as informal leadership groups 
and for the possible sources and strategies of legitimation of directoires and their impact. 
Second, the article will trace how the E3 has made use of the different sources of legitimacy to 
justify their authority in the EU and outline the three legitimation strategies mentioned above. 
The article will conclude with the wider implications of its main research findings. 
 
 
The Legitimacy Problem of Directoires 
 
Informal groups of states can take many different forms. What they have in common is that 
they offer informal decision-making arenas, which were not foreseen in the treaty or agreement 
that established or regulates the organizations in which they are embedded (Christiansen and 
Neuhold, 2013: 1197), and that exercise a leadership role regarding certain issues (Aggestam 
and Bicchi, 2019). However, no typology of distinct designs of informal groups of states has 
emerged. This article argues that informal groups of states can be found in a multidimensional 
space that reflects the variation in the features of different informal groups of states that are 
most controversial for non-members. Building on the dimensions of informal division of labour 
in EU foreign policy-making by Delreux and Keukeleire (2017: 8), these are (a) the degree of 
exclusiveness of an informal group’s membership; (b) the extent to which the relationship 
between group and non-group members is organized hierarchically; and (c) the duration of a 
group’s existence. 
The first two dimensions are particularly problematic because they undermine two fundamental 
principles of international relations in general, namely fairness and equality amongst nation 
states (Zaum, 2013), and key ‘behavioural rules’ in EU foreign and security policy, e.g. the co-
ordination reflex and consensus building (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). The third dimension is 
challenging because the prolonged existence of an informal group will foster the long-term 
institutionalization of what is in the eyes of the non-members an illegitimate group of states. 
However, the degree to which these challenges manifest themselves can vary in each of the 
three dimensions. Consequently, they should be seen as continuums that range from largely 
uncontroversial to highly controversial. More specifically, this means that: (a) an informal 
group’s exclusiveness can range from being open to any member state that is willing and 
capable to participate to being closed to any state that does not form part of an exclusive group 
of self-selected states; (b) the degree of hierarchy between a group’s members and non-
members can range from entirely flat, where an informal group is merely a policy consultation 
mechanism, to high, where a group does not only discuss and prepare policies, but also 
implements and enforces them; and (c) the duration of a group’s existence can vary from being 
just short to being prolonged over several years. 
 
Figure 1: Informal groups of states in a multidimensional space. 
 Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
If these three dimensions are used to create a multidimensional space (see Figure 1), informal 
groups of states can be located anywhere within this space depending on their specific 
characteristics. The most controversial informal groups – in the top-right corner in the rear – 
are long-standing, self-selected groups that implement policies hierarchically in the sense of 
‘one actor possess[ing] authority over a second’ (Lake, 2009: 38). So, they are essentially 
directoires as defined in this article. As they are located at the extreme end of each of the three 
controversial aspects of informal groups, their legitimacy problem is particularly pronounced. 
Arguably, however, the members of directoires could use their power to overcome the group’s 
inherent legitimacy problem. It is conceivable, for example, that they use coercion or bribery 
to compensate the directoire’s lack of legitimacy (Reus-Smit, 2007: 167). In this regard, 
directoire members have important power sources: First, they may have superior technical 
expertise, intelligence information, military hardware or diplomatic clout to implement and 
enforce a directoire’s policies. Second, they have the ability to establish a directoire as a 
credible alternative group outside a formal international organization if their push for the 
establishment of a directoire within the organization is rejected (Stone, 2011). In the long term, 
however, it is unlikely that directoires are able to exercise their authority based merely on their 
power base. As Aggestam and Bicchi (2019: 519) argue, leadership is ‘a social, relational role 
between a leader and its followers (…). In this sense, leadership is an activity that is co-
constitutive and only possible if it is perceived as legitimate by the followers’. In fact, having 
legitimacy in the eyes of others is widely seen as a crucial factor for any actor that exercises 
leadership, including in international affairs (Clark, 2003; Hurd, 2007; Reus-Smit, 2007). This 
legitimacy needs to be earned and maintained over time (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
 
 
Sources and Strategies of Legitimation 
 
A wide variety of actors are known to seek actively legitimacy in the eyes of other actors 
through so-called ‘legitimation strategies’ (Gronau and Schmidtke, 2016). Although very little 
attention has been paid to the legitimation strategies by informal groups of states, they can be 
expected to try to gain and maintain legitimacy as any other political actor with leadership 
ambitions would. In the words of Reus-Smit (2007: 159), ‘Political actors are constantly 
seeking legitimacy for themselves or their preferred institutions and in doing so they engage in 
practices of legitimation’. As the existing literature has shown, legitimation processes are 
inherently interactive, i.e. while political actors may foster legitimacy in top-down processes, 
gaining legitimacy depends ultimately on bottom-up processes through which actors recognize 
the legitimacy of others (Bernstein, 2011; Gronau and Schmidtke, 2016; Lake, 2009). As the 
literature on political leadership has shown, leaders depend ultimately on their followers 
(Parker and Karlsson, 2014). This article will consider both processes in its case study of the 
E3. In other words, it will analyse how the E3 used different types of legitimation sources in 
their effort to gain and maintain legitimacy and how this affected the support they received 
from the other member states. The main focus is on legitimation at the intergovernmental level 
within the EU, where a small, informal group of nation states forms the ‘legitimacy object’ 
(Wimmel, 2009: 185) and other EU member states form the relevant constituency (Clark, 
2003).2 The leadership focus is, thus, on the vertical dimension between EU member states 
inside and outside the E3 (see Aggestam and Johansson, 2017: 1206). Building on the three 
key criteria of state legitimacy by Beetham (1991), political actors can have three generic 
sources of legitimation at their disposal: (a) pragmatic problem-solving, (b) adjustments in 
institutional design and (c) institutional and policy congruence building. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the key advantage of informal arrangements such as 
directoires is usually considered to be their more efficient problem-solving capability in 
comparison with formal international organizations. More specifically, informal arrangements 
improve the efficiency and speed of decision-making by lowering short-term transaction costs 
and overcoming the structural constraints and stumbling blocks of formal institutions such as 
veto players or cumbersome procedures (Prantl, 2005; Vabulas and Snidal, 2013). 
Consequently, directoires are able to offer efficient solutions to issues that may not only be in 
the interest of the directoire members but of a wider community of states, in particular the states 
that are not members of the directoire but of the international organization in which it is 
embedded (Biermann et al., 2009). So, directoire members can use their problem-solving 
capability to justify their authority vis-à-vis non-members, although the success of such a 
strategy depends eventually on the recognition of that capability by the non-members. If 
successful, a directoire gains what is known in the literature on democratic legitimacy as 
‘output-oriented legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999). As Suchman (1995: 581) suggests, this type of 
legitimacy could go so far as to become ‘structurally legitimate’ in the sense that the non-
members recognize the directoire as the ‘right organization for the job’. 
When it comes to the participation of other states in the decision-making procedure of the 
directoire, the members of the directoire have – by definition – little leeway. Their efficiency 
depends on a low number of participants. So, what Scharpf (1999) calls ‘input-oriented 
legitimacy’ is difficult to achieve. It is even more complicated to reconcile the practice of 
directoires with the norms and principles of ‘democratic legitimacy’ that has emerged 
especially in the literature on EU foreign and security policy (Sjursen, 2011). Yet, at the very 
least, directoires can resort to the selective use of informal groups within international 
organizations (Stone, 2011). That is, they can limit the role of the directoire to exceptional 
situations, where directoire members have a particularly strong interest in efficient problem-
solving. At the same time, non-members can be compensated with equal participation in 
decision- and policy-making during ‘ordinary times’ (Stone, 2011: 18-19; see also Delreux and 
Keukeleire, 2017: 10). Furthermore, directoires can adjust their decision-making processes. As 
in the case of Schmidt (2013)’s concept of ‘throughput legitimacy’ or Biermann et al. (2009)’s 
concept of consultative and cooperative leadership, this may include procedural changes that 
increase the accountability, inclusiveness and transparency of the decisions taken by the 
directoire. In this regard, increased information-sharing and improved deliberation processes 
may also increase the legitimacy of a closed group of states, as Hurd’s (2007) research on non-
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council suggests. Even the institutional set-up 
of a directoire could be adapted to make it more legitimate (Gronau and Schmidtke, 2016). In 
short, directoire members have various options to establish a legitimation strategy based on 
adjustments in their institutional design. If these adjustments are sufficient will depend, once 
more, on the acceptance by the non-members. The latter will be influenced by the degree of 
intergovernmental accountability; that is the degree to which the decisions and actions of an 
informal group can be scrutinized, in how far it can be held responsible for them and if it 
accepts any kind of input from the non-members (see Schmidt, 2013, 6). 
Finally, legitimacy is related to the congruence between the actions and policies of the political 
actor that seeks legitimacy and the basic values and shared beliefs of its constituency (Gronau 
and Schmidtke, 2016; Zaum, 2013). If a political actor wants to lead, it needs to take into 
consideration the concrete context and the needs and demands of its followers (Nye, 2009). 
More generally, the legitimacy of an actor or institution depends on the need to be ‘perceived 
as desirable, proper, and appropriate within any given cultural context’ (Suchman, 1995: 586; 
see also Bernstein, 2011: 24). In other words, a directoire and its policies should reflect the 
broader identity of the international organization in which it is embedded (Gronau and 
Schmidtke, 2016: 541-542). More specifically, the non-members of the directoire need to 
accept a directoire and its policies not only out of a narrow self-interest in getting common 
problems solved but also because they can identify with them. To this end, a directoire can 
make sure that its actions and communications are embedded in the values and principles of 
the international organization in question. It can also signal specifically its support for them. 
 
 
E3 Legitimation Strategies 
 
Since its inception in 2003, the E3 has been the arguably most salient example of a directoire 
in EU foreign and security policy. It had an exclusive membership limited to France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom and exercised a leadership role on the whole of the EU’s Iran policies 
(Alcaro, 2018: 5), lasting for an extraordinarily long time of more than 15 years (Adebahr, 
2017: 162). As such, it had a particularly pronounced legitimacy problem in relation with the 
other EU member states. Building upon the systematic analysis of key documents from the EU 
and its member states, news outlets, WikiLeaks sources and 25 semi-structured elite interviews 
with key participants in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, including E3 political directors and 
ambassadors, EU officials, representatives from ten EU member states and various Iranian and 
US sources, this section will carry out a longitudinal case study that traces the patterns of the 
E3 efforts to gain legitimacy from other EU member states between 2003 and 2015. In this 
regard, it will pay special attention to the possible legitimation sources and strategies outlined 
above and the impact they had on EU non-members. 
The E3 diplomatic engagement with Iran has been divided into three phases on the basis of the 
group’s institutional relationship with the EU itself. During Phase One (October 2003 to 
October 2004), the E3 acted outside of EU formal institutions. Phase Two (November 2004 to 
December 2009) saw the inclusion of the EU High Representative into the E3 format. The final 
stage, from January 2010 to July 2015, represented a period where EU foreign and security 
policy was subject to institutional reforms as a consequence of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
 
 
Phase One: The E3 outside the EU 
 
Through a set of informal conversations in October 2003, the foreign ministers of France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom decided to take action on the Iranian nuclear dossier once 
the risk of a referral to the UN Security Council or of military escalation of the crisis became 
a real possibility. According to those involved in these talks, in shaping their initiative, the E3 
swiftly opted for an informal group instead of relying on the foreign and security policy tools 
provided by EU institutions as they perceived that, in order to avoid an escalation of the Iranian 
nuclear crisis, they had to circumvent the potential deadlocks in the EU formal decision-making 
process (Interviews 2, 21 and 22). In the eyes of E3 diplomats, a Union of then 15 member 
states, with different views and national interests, was ill-equipped to act diplomatically in a 
fast and united way (Interviews 2 and 8). In other words, the justification of the choice of the 
E3 format focused heavily on the E3’s enhanced problem-solving capacity in terms of 
efficiency and speed in comparison with the formal EU mechanisms. To this end, the E3 was 
set up as a ‘competing informal institution’ (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013: 1200). 
As a consequence, throughout Phase One, the E3 acted outside the EU legal framework, 
without seeking a formal mandate before they launched the initiative, thus presenting those 
member states not involved in the talks with a fait accompli (Interviews 5 and 8). The E3 did 
not even consult with or inform the then High Representative, Javier Solana, about the three 
foreign ministers’ first trip to Tehran in October 2003 and did not search for a mandate from 
formal EU institutions (Interviews 5 and 14). Even the much-heralded Tehran Declaration 
between Iran and the E3 – the main negotiation outcome during Phase One – was signed in 
October 2003 without any formal EU role or support (Ahlström, 2005: 27). At the same time, 
however, the E3 declared to act in line with the overall directives and goals of EU policy toward 
Iran, emphasizing the European dimension of their efforts (Interviews 4 and 13). 
During Phase One the E3 thus tried to dissociate their initiative from the formal EU institutions, 
operating outside them while downplaying the hierarchical nature of their approach and 
emphasizing their problem-solving abilities. Yet, this legitimation strategy showed little 
success. The General Affairs and External Relations Council refrained from publicly 
acknowledging the E3 initiative during Phase One, praising instead the efforts of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (Harnisch, 2007: 9). Furthermore, a wide variety of EU 
member states were very outspoken in their criticism of the E3 (Interview 3, 8 and 22). Dutch 
and Belgian officials, for instance, declared their outrage about the role the E3 assumed and, 
soon after the signature of the Tehran Declaration, they stated that the initiative breached 
European principles of multilateralism (Interviews 5 and 6). They also complained in closed-
door meetings that the E3 were keeping their discussions on Iran from other EU members (US 
Embassy in The Hague, 2003). Dissatisfaction within the Union over the E3 framework 
intensified in February 2004, when the E3 held a meeting in Berlin prior to an EU summit. 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands expressed their disapproval about ‘a divisive nucleus which 
would threaten European unity’ and through which they were ‘not even being informed of the 
issues or decisions made’, whilst their apprehensiveness over their exclusion and the 
circumvention of EU formal institutions increased (Powell, 2004). 
 
 
Phase Two: The Inclusion of the High Representative 
 
In the second half of 2004, faced with the potential collapse of talks with Iran, the E3 realised 
it needed to increase its leverage in the negotiations with Tehran, offering financial and 
economic incentives that would convince the country to curb its nuclear activities. Throughout 
Phase One of the initiative, the E3 operated outside the EU institutions and could thus not rely 
on instruments which fell under the competences of the Union. To be able to offer appealing 
incentives to Tehran, such as talks on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the E3 
needed to commit the EU as a whole, thus changing the group’s relationship with the EU legal 
framework and gaining the legitimacy of the excluded EU members (Interviews 4 and 22). 
During the EU Council meeting of October 2004, the E3 thus decided that the best way to 
operate within the Union was to change the institutional design of the group and to formally 
involve High Representative Javier Solana in the talks (Council of the European Union, 2004a). 
Enforcement, either through coercion or via operating outside the institutions, would not have 
achieved the intended results, as Phase One demonstrated. Shortly after, the E3, which from 
November 2004 on came to be known as the E3/EU (to indicate the involvement of the Union), 
was recognized explicitly in dealing with the Iranian dossier by official documents issued by 
the EU. The Presidency conclusions of the European Council placed the initiative within the 
EU legal framework (Council of the European Union, 2004b). This recognition was confirmed 
through the 2004 Paris Agreement, the main negotiation achievement during Phase Two, which 
diverged from the Tehran Declaration in that the governments of the E3 and Iran signed it 
explicitly ‘with the support of the High Representative of the European Union’, therefore co-
opting the whole EU as part of the process (Solana, 2004). In March 2005, the Council also 
made explicit references to the E3/EU acknowledging that the group was acting on behalf of 
the Union (Council of the European Union, 2005). 
Although initially the involvement of the High Representative in the negotiations changed very 
little in terms of the dynamics and the E3 centrality in the decision-making process within the 
group (Interviews 2 and 16), the EU was increasingly represented in talks with Iran by the High 
Representative. Over time, the institutional change of the informal group through the co-
optation of an actor formally established in the Treaties played a constructive role in 
overcoming the concerns of the member states excluded from the E3. In this regard, 
information-sharing, a fundamental process in Council working groups (Juncos and Pomorska, 
2006), was particularly relevant (Interviews 11, 17, 18 and 19). During the first year of the E3 
initiative, deliberations were secretive and lacked co-ordination with other member states 
(Interview 3). But the co-optation of the High Representative strengthened the communication 
channel between those inside and those outside the E3. The EU Council was informed of any 
progress in the talks, with briefings and consultations taking place on a monthly basis before 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings (Interview 1 and 11). This 
facilitated the exchange and access to sensitive information which would have been otherwise 
withheld, thus increasing the E3’s transparency, inclusiveness and accountability. It even laid 
the groundwork for a growing implementation of the policies on Iran in Brussels, where 
unanimous decisions were to be taken on the use of EU instruments, such as talks on a TCA 
or, later on, the adoption of sanctions. In other words, the co-optation of the High 
Representative triggered a process of partial ‘Brusselization’ (Allen, 1998) or even of partial 
Europeanisation, as a senior EU official argued (Interview 9). But the E3 still remained firmly 
in the driver’s seat when it came to the formulation of the policies (Interview 1 and 3). 
Due to the co-optation of the High Representative, all EU member states, particularly those 
who did not want to take a backseat in the initiative, could ensure that their interests were 
represented (Hanau Santini, 2010: 475). The intense level of information-sharing through the 
E3/EU format remained ‘key in keeping the non-E3 member states happy’, easing tensions and 
removing discontent and concerns of a directoire acting in competition with the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy (Interviews 1 and 5). Even though the E3 maintained the 
leadership in terms of policy-making on Iran (Interview 3), Solana – acting as ‘an advisor and 
bridge between the E3 and the EU-25’ – managed to bring enough political momentum to 
effectively transform the E3/EU initiative into a European venture (US Embassy in Brussels, 
2004). Once the High Representative was associated with the talks, EU member states – 
including those that were previously critical of the E3 – accepted the role of the trio, 
recognising that an informal group was the best formula to have the flexibility and intra-EU 
co-ordination needed to deal with the issue (Interviews 11, 12, 17, 18, 19 and 20; Mazzucelli, 
2009: 333), as long as the E3 did not turn into a wide-spread foreign and security policy 
mechanism (Interview 8 and 9). Although tensions over the EU’s Iran policy re-emerged 
occasionally amongst the member states (Onderco, 2015), the E3 were able to maintain their 
legitimacy through the new E3/EU format. 
In fact, the legitimacy of the group further increased once the Iran dossier was referred to the 
UN Security Council in late 2005, after Iran stopped complying with its obligations under the 
Paris Agreement, and as a result China, Russia and the United States joined forces with the 
E3/EU. The efforts of the group, which since early 2006 became known as the E3/EU+3 (or 
informally as the P5+1), were explicitly recognised by the UN Security Council. All parties 
involved agreed that the E3/EU should act as a co-ordinator for the whole group (Cronberg, 
2017: 253), being delegated the role of ‘important player and bridge-builder, both globally and 
regionally’ (Solana and Moeller, 2006). For convenience, and in order to have one man 
speaking for all, the High Representative acted as spokesperson for the whole group (Interview 
4 and 5) and also represented all those EU states excluded from the group. 
 
 
Phase Three: The Integration of the E3 and the EU 
 
Following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, Catherine Ashton took 
over from Javier Solana in chairing the E3/EU+3 as chief negotiator on the Iranian nuclear 
dossier. Through the institutional reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the High 
Representative was also assigned significant representative and participatory roles in EU 
foreign and security policy matters, de facto becoming the external representative of the Union. 
Furthermore, the High Representative was provided with a diplomatic service: the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which was formally launched in December 2010. Most 
notably, Catherine Ashton centralized the EEAS Iran experts in a new strategic planning 
division, which ‘facilitate[d] the direct and less bureaucratic coordination of the High 
Representative’s negotiations with Iran’ (Kienzle, 2013). In practice, this meant that the High 
Representative and her team assumed an even more central role in relation with the E3 than 
was originally envisioned by the E3 when they co-opted Javier Solana at the beginning of Phase 
Two. Far from having just a co-ordination role among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, both Catherine 
Ashton and Federica Mogherini (who took over as EU High Representative in December 
2014), managed, through their teams, to control the agenda, set the process and negotiate the 
content of the agreement and of its annexes (De La Baume, 2015). Although the E3 remained 
centrally involved in the policy formulation and implementation processes of the E3/EU 
(Interview 1 and 3), E3 leadership became less pronounced than in Phases One and Two. But 
the leading role assumed by EU diplomats during the expert level discussions with Iran during 
Phase Three also led to a further increase of the legitimacy of the E3/EU within the EU and to 
a progressive convergence of the positions of the E3 and the rest of the EU (Interview 3 and 
7). 
This growing convergence eased the adoption of unilateral EU sanctions against Iran – a key 
tool in the international two-track approach based on negotiations and sanctions (Interview 16). 
Sanctions against Iran constituted one of the most sensitive and controversial issues amongst 
EU member states, occasionally raising tensions between the E3/EU and a number of EU 
countries not directly involved in the talks but with strong economic ties with Tehran. Talks 
on the introduction of unilateral restrictive measures started already in 2007 and were led by 
France and the UK, which advocated for the need to adopt ‘tougher sanctions both at the UN 
and in the European Union, including on oil and gas investment and the financial sector’ against 
Tehran (US Embassy in London, 2007). Because of the additional powers granted to the High 
Representative and the assistance of the EEAS, once Catherine Ashton got in charge of the 
talks in December 2009, she managed for the first time to translate the two countries’ designed 
policy into reality, convincing all skeptical EU member states to dovetail their economic efforts 
in the interests of the E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran (Interview 10). Even the countries more 
critical of unilateral sanctions, such as Austria and Spain, ‘shifted from insisting on UNSC 
sanctions only to accepting that [they had] to consider EU sanctions’ (US Embassy in Vienna, 
2010). 
Eventually, in 2010, European hesitations on targeting the Iranian economy came to an end. In 
January 2012 the EU even agreed to impose an oil embargo against Iran, which eventually 
increased substantially the economic pressure on Iran. During this phase, the impression was 
that, for the first time, the conversation about the need to implement specific measures on Iran 
was taking place directly in Brussels (Interview 25). So, at this stage it is possible to observe a 
significant convergence of the positions of the E3 and the wider EU. Although there is little 
evidence to suggest that this was the result of the socialization of skeptical EU states into the 
E3/EU approach to deal with Iran, it can be seen as ‘strategic socialisation’, where social 
pressure by the E3/EU motivated the skeptical EU states to comply ‘as part of their long-term 
interest calculation’ (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). 
In Phase Three, as Helga Schmid, then the EEAS’s Deputy Secretary General for Political 
Affairs, pointed out, ‘the co-ordination of the EU with the support of the E3 has proven to be 
effective in the E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran’ (Interview 23). Iranian officials argued there 
was a clearer ‘feeling of Europeanization’ and co-ordination with all other countries within the 
E3/EU+3 (Interview 24). In practice, the E3/EU turned from a ‘competing’ into a 
‘complementary informal institution’, not unlike other high-level groups in EU integration 
(Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013: 1199). Therefore, particularly once the interim agreement 
and the comprehensive deal were reached in November 2013 and July 2015 respectively, the 
success of the E3/EU format reflected positively on the EU as a whole. The agreements with 
Iran were, in essence, proof of the problem-solving ability of the E3/EU in the name of the 
whole of the EU. After twelve years of negotiations, during which an immense political capital 
had been invested in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, the 
E3/EU, and the Union with it, was given a large share of the credit for the outcome of the 
negotiations and emerged ‘as the actor whose role was indispensable for the process’ (Interview 
15). More generally, the initiative resulted in the perception of greater actorness for the EU as 
a whole, while also affecting the identity of the Union as an international actor (Alcaro, 2018: 
212-213). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The existence of directoires raises important issues about the organizational behaviour of 
informal groups of states concerning non-members and about the institutional design of their 
relationship with the international organization in which they are embedded. This paper has 
shed light on a hitherto under-researched, yet crucial issue in informal governance, namely how 
informal groups may overcome their inherent dilemma between efficiency and legitimacy and 
exercise leadership vis-à-vis the non-members. To this end, it has focused on the legitimation 
sources and strategies of directoires, i.e. small groups of states that have a particularly 
pronounced legitimacy problem within the international organization in which they operate. 
More specifically, the analysis of the legitimation of the E3 and, from late 2004 on, the E3/EU 
in the nuclear negotiations with Iran has shown that it is very difficult, but not impossible, to 
overcome the inherent legitimacy deficit of directoires in the eyes of the non-members. As a 
least-likely case for overcoming the efficiency-legitimacy dilemma, the E3 case study offers 
strong support for the importance of sustained legitimation strategies by directoires to gain 
internal legitimacy within the international organization in which they are embedded. In the 
case of other, less controversial formats of informal groups of states (see, for example, 
Elgström, 2017) it is arguably even more likely that legitimation strategies can resolve a 
groups’ legitimacy dilemma, underpinning recent arguments about the increasing leadership 
role of informal groups in EU foreign and security policy (Aggestam and Bicchi, 2019; Delreux 
and Keukeleire, 2017). However, further research on informal groups in different locations 
within the three-dimensional space in Figure 1 is needed to explain how and to what extent 
non-directoires are able to gain legitimacy from non-members and, thus, to lead on certain 
foreign and security policy issues. 
Furthermore, the longitudinal case study of the internal legitimacy of the E3 in three different 
phases between 2003 and 2015 suggests that some legitimation strategies can be more effective 
in creating legitimacy than others, offering new avenues for future research to explore the 
variation in impact of legitimation strategies. The E3’s first approach was largely unsuccessful 
in fostering the group’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the other EU member states. In essence, they 
adopted a ‘detachment strategy’ that established the E3 as a largely separate entity from the 
EU. There were no institutional links between the E3, the other EU member states and the EU 
as an international organization. The E3 alluded to the consistency between their actions on 
Iran and the broader European values and principles only in some of their declarations. Despite 
overcoming the structural constraints of the EU and offering pragmatic problem-solving, 
which, through engagement with Iran, led to the 2003 Tehran Declaration, the E3 mostly lacked 
legitimacy amongst the EU member states not involved in the initiative. In other words, even 
though the E3 were firmly in the driving seat, they were unable to exercise vertical leadership, 
that is in relation with the other member states. This highlights Aggestam and Johansson 
(2017)’s argument about ‘a paradox at the heart of EU foreign policy between the demand for 
leadership effectiveness (strategic action) and perceptions of legitimate leadership (appropriate 
behaviour)’. In practical terms, it suggests that the key advantage of a directoire, i.e. its high 
degree of efficiency as problem-solver in comparison with the formal international 
organization in which it is embedded, cannot make up for its substantial legitimacy deficit due 
to its exclusive and hierarchical nature. Generally speaking, output legitimacy may not always 
compensate the lack of input legitimacy. 
After roughly one year, the E3 abandoned the ‘detachment strategy’ and adopted what can be 
called a ‘co-optation strategy’ in the hope to become more effective in negotiations with 
Tehran, indirectly addressing the legitimacy gap. This strategy focused on an adjustment in 
institutional design that involved ‘co-opting’ the High Representative, while also improving 
the information exchange with other EU member states. While this approach did hardly 
increase the E3’s input legitimacy – the E3 remained essentially an exclusive group taking 
decisions hierarchically – it did alleviate key concerns among the large majority of EU member 
states by increasing the accountability, inclusiveness and transparency of the decisions taken 
by the group. This shows how minor institutional adjustments akin to the ideas of ‘throughput 
legitimacy’ and consultative and cooperative organizational leadership can have a significant 
impact in terms of legitimacy gains and the ability to lead other nation states. As Hurd (2007) 
has already shown in the case of the 1945 UN Conference in San Francisco, small states tend 
to put a lot of value on the simple fact that they are being heard. The ability of the ‘co-optation’ 
strategy to foster legitimacy is also a reflection of the legitimacy-enhancing role representatives 
of international organizations can play, in particular in directoires but potentially also in other 
types of informal groups. 
After the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the originally rather pragmatic inclusion of the High 
Representative in the E3 out of strategic and instrumental considerations became over time a 
much more integrated relationship, blurring the distinction between informal and formal 
Treaties-based elements. In essence, the E3/EU and the EU as a whole converged in their 
approach to Iran, with overt E3 leadership shifting to a more diffuse ‘European’ leadership. 
This is a reflection of what can be called an ‘integration strategy’, where a directoire’s inherent 
legitimacy problem is overcome by the increasing congruence between the directoire’s policies 
and the policies of the non-members. That is, a directoire becomes virtually indistinguishable 
from the larger international organizations in terms of institutions, policies and, ultimately, 
identity. In more general terms, the E3 have moved from pragmatic legitimacy to cognitive 
legitimacy, where a political actor is basically taken for granted by the others (Suchman, 1995: 
584). This, in turn, has strengthened the E3/EU’s problem-solving capabilities in the 
negotiations with Iran, as reflected, for example, in the EU’s unusually strict sanctions against 
Iran or the E3/EU’s leadership role in the context of the UN Security Council in form of the 
E3/EU+3. As Prantl (584-85) has argued already regarding informal groups in the UN, a small 
group’s increased problem-solving ability may eventually feed back into the strengthened 
legitimacy of the larger international organization. In other words, the legitimacy and, 
eventually, the leadership capability of the whole of the EU may have benefited as a result of 
the E3/EU’s problem-solving abilities, confirming a ‘new set of interactions in which 
cooperation among small groups of member states can help to address shortcomings in the EU 
foreign policy system’ (Aggestam and Bicchi, 2019). Arguably, ‘integration strategies’ may 
work particularly well for informal groups that are less controversial according to their location 
in the three-dimensional space in Figure 1. 
In sum, the sustained use of legitimation strategies is crucial to overcome the efficiency-
legitimacy dilemma of directoires and – potentially – other, less controversial types of informal 
groups in international organizations, if these groups want to exercise leadership over non-
members. However, more research is needed to examine the varying impact of different 
legitimation strategies in distinct types of informal groups and their leadership ambitions. 
Gaining legitimacy is a complex and difficult endeavour in international affairs. 
 
Notes 
 
1. ‘E3’ is used here exclusively for the group comprising France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. As will be shown in the article, the E3 will co-operate with other actors in different 
formats, e.g. E3/EU or E3/EU+3. 
2. Another important aspect is the legitimation vis-à-vis external actors, e.g. Iran. However, 
external legitimation strategies of informal groups go beyond the scope of this article. 
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